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SUMMARY 
 
This paper presents a longitudinal study on the management of the natural resources by the San 
Rafael Company, a leading Mexican pulp and paper company, in the 1947-1991 period. This study 
illustrates the need for the use of more encompassing and dynamic frameworks in analyzing 
corporate environmental performance, including especially environmental, institutional and social 
dynamics dimensions into the analysis.  
The author acknowledges the support of SSHRC through the research grant ‘Global Justice and 
the role of Multinational Corporations in developing areas’ and is grateful to Dr. Frederick Bird, 
Concordia University for previous versions of this paper. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1942, as Mexico needed increasing amounts of lumber for its industrial development, a national 
Forestry law established a system of concessions aimed at intensifying lumber production for 
supplying industrial users.  
Under this new management regime, natural-resources-based companies would receive a 
concession to secure their lumber supply and manage scientifically specific forested areas 
(Simonian,  1995, Hinojosa Ortiz, 1958). In the following 8 years were established around 20 
concessions to specific companies that lasted until 1991. In this paper, we are particularly 
investigating the management practices of the San Rafael Company, one of the beneficiary 
companies under this system.  
The San Rafael Company was then the leading Mexican pulp and paper producer. From 1947 to 
1991, its Forestry Unit managed a forested area of around 120,000 ha in the Iztaccihuatl - 
Popocatepétl (Izta - Popo) area, at the South-Eastern tip of the Basin of Mexico, in the States of 
Mexico, Puebla and Morelos.  
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1. THEORY ON CORPORATE SOCIAL PERFORMANCE 
Most frameworks in Management Studies aiming at assessing Corporate Environmental 
Performance are static and company-centered frameworks (See Clarkson, 1995 ; Wood and Jones, 
1995 for excellent summaries). Our intention in this paper is to argue for the use of a historical and 
multiple stakeholder perspective to assess the management of a resource base by a company. The 
narration and analysis of this part of the history of the San Rafael Company is aimed at illustrating 
this theoretical argument. The remainder of the paper is organized in three sections. The first 
section is mainly descriptive. Elements on the Mexican national lumber policy and their 
implications on the areas managed by San Rafael in the 1947-1991 period are provided. The 
second section is overarchingly evaluative. We briefly assess the implications of this corporate 
environmental policy from the perspectives of : 1) ecological sustainability, 2) institutional ; and 
3) local social dynamics. The last section is reflective and theoretical. We draw some implications 
for further research on corporate environmental policy.  
1.1. The case study : San Rafael — The context : Mexico in the 1940s 
In the 1940s, as Mexico was industrializing fast, there was an increasing need for lumber, 
especially for construction, electrification and industrialization needs. However, timber was rare 
and expensive, and this situation was likely to worsen as needs were increasing. In spite of its 
relatively good endowment in forests, Mexico needed to import cellulose and construction timber 
(Hinojosa, Ortiz, 1958). World War II further restricted the possibility to import from Canada and 
the United States and aggravated this shortage situation.  
This led Mexican officials to view the largely untapped potential of the forests as storehouses for 
raw materials for the development of the national economy. Hinojosa Ortiz1 (1958, p. 9) calculated 
that in 1955, the forestry sector in Mexico represented for around 25 % of the output of the steel 
industry and had an “enormous potential for the welfare of the country”. 
However, the forestry sector was not fulfilling this potential. Its problems were plethora. If there 
was an agreement that the portfolio had a potential, it does not seem that Mexican officials and 
scientists had a clear idea of its actual content. For instance, official estimates of the forested area 
were unclear. They oscillated between 28 million ha in 1944 to 25 million ha in 1952, 39 million 
in 1950 (Hinojosa Ortiz, 1958, p. 11-12). If the overall picture was unclear, local studies were also 
often deficient. Accurate information on forest maps, forested areas, stock per ha (existence 
per ha), exploitation cycles, and land ownership border (limites de propiedad) was often lacking. 
Hinojosa Ortiz (1958) cited the example of the logging plans of a specific company conducted 
 
1 Various authors and researchers interested in the history of the management of the conservation and forests in Mexico (Hinojosa Ortiz, 
1958 ; Chambille, 1983 ; Simonian, 1995 ; Huerta Gonzalez, 1994 ; Alvarez Icaza et al. 1993) pinpoint the overall deficiencies of the 
archives. The main source used for this section on the forestry sector in Mexico in the mid century is Hinojosa Ortiz’s 1958 book entitled 
Los Bosques de México, historia de una injusticia y de un despilfarro (The forests of Mexico, History of an injustice and of a waste). 
This book was the result of a report asked to Hinojosa Ortiz by Mexican officials. However, once the book was published in 1958, it was 
withdrawn from bookstores and libraries and confiscated for its specific information and adamant conclusions for the official forestry 
policy (Source : Fernando Vargas, Historian of the Parks of Mexico, Instituto Nacional de Ecologia, SEMARNAP, January 2000). 
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between 1930 and 1951 by the same forestry engineers. In the 6 different studies, logging cycles 
for pine trees varied between 60 and 119 years.  
But scientific and informational deficiencies were not the main cause for the overall low efficiency 
of the forestry sector. What was causing this low efficiency was the actual production process and 
labor organization of the sector. Independent studies conducted in 1945 calculated that between 
30 % and 50 % of the timber logged was left and wasted in the forest, and that classification of 
timber qualities — and even species — was often deficient (cited in Hinojosa Ortiz, 1958, p. 52). 
Land reform had also contributed to dividing forested areas into relatively small ownership units, 
which limited the sector’s possibility to grow. Most productive plants were small-sized, endowed 
with old equipment “ that can not make rational use of the logged timber ” (Hinojosa Ortiz, 1958, 
p. 52). 
In any case, the State obviously lacked the financial and human means to monitor the enforcement 
of the forest law. Hinojosa Ortiz (1958, p. 31) calculated that in 1953, the Federal Forestry 
administration had 223 technicians, 464 administrative employees, and 1 093 forest wardens for 
around 35 millions ha of forests. In mere numerical terms, dividing the forested area by the 
number of wards, each forest ward was responsible for the monitoring of around 34 000 ha of 
forests. Quite a task indeed ! The effectiveness of the Forestry Administration was further 
hampered by the fact that about half of the whole personnel worked in MexicoCity and a large 
proportion of the remainder in State capitals. Also, “ they lacked vehicles, travel expenses, their 
salaries were notoriously low, which made them easy targets for bribery ” (Hinojosa Ortiz, 1958, 
p. 33).  
Finally, this limited personnel, endowed with minimal financial and technical resources, saw their 
capacity for action further crippled by the fact that most of their working time was dedicated to 
“ vicious bureaucratic procedures ” (procedimientos burocraticos viciosos), (…) “ which lead the 
forest personnel to constantly manage paperwork instead of trees ; all these complicated rules 
make that the personnel remains remote from of its true function, (…) they have to stay in the 
office instead of going to the field ” (Hinojosa Ortiz, 1958, p. 33).  
To summarize, the inefficient use of the forestry resources was increasingly representing an 
obstacle to the fast expansion of the Mexican industry while the State had limited capacities to 
address this challenge. Mexican officials then enacted a new forestry law to address the problem 
and “manage rationally and scientifically the forests” (Simonian, 1995).  
1.2. The 1942 law and the new management regime 
The 1942 law aimed at addressing these problems. Since the State had limited means to enforce a 
policy, it tightened its control on the management of the forests through a regime aimed at 
favoring key companies in the country. Thus, the 1942 law imposed (1) the Forestal, a specific 
organizational template, (2) centrally decided forestry methods, (3) a regime of forced 
collaboration between the Forestal and the ejidos, farmers’ cooperatives owners most of the 
Mexican forests.  
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The law established an organizational template : the Unidad Industrial de Explotacion Forestal 
(Industrial Forest Exploitation Unit). We will designate these organizations as Forestal (singular) 
and Forestales (plural). In this new regime, the government placed contiguous properties — often 
owned by the farmers — under a single management plan conducted by the Forestal for the 
supply of raw materials to a specific industrial plant such as paper and mining (Simonian, 1995). 
Forestales were established by presidential decree and were officially departments of the Secretary 
of Agriculture ; however, as service providers in forestry, they were funded by the companies they 
were supplying raw materials to.  
1.3. Local context : the San Rafael Company  
San Rafael is a village located within the municipal territory of Tlalmanalco, at the foothills of the 
Iztaccihuatl volcano, on the eastern boundaries of the State of Mexico, 40 km south east of Mexico 
City. The San Rafael pulp and paper Company was established at the end of the nineteenth 
Century in the village of San Rafael due to the location advantages : (1) access to the abundant 
raw materials, water and lumber ; (2) lower temperature due to the altitude that made the 
manufacturing processes possible in a tropical country ; and (3) proximity to Mexico City, the 
main national market (Arango Miranda, 1997). The establishment of the San Rafael company 
represented a key element in the national Mexican industrialization strategy based on foreign and 
national private direct investments in consumer goods industrial sectors (Garcia Luna, 1998).  
Endowed with modern equipment, abundant natural resources, and a protected national market, the 
San Rafael Company soon became the leading pulp and paper company in Mexico. It enjoyed a 
monopoly in the supply of paper to national newspapers until the 1930s. The Company grew from 
120 workers in 1900 to 2 000 in the early 1940s, the village being widely acknowledged as a 
privileged enclave and as a social model (Espejel, 1993).  
Land reform in the 1920s and 1930s had allocated most of the land in the Izta-Popo area to ejidos 
— farming cooperatives, the collective owners of the land. During the land reform, peasants 
organized into a population nucleus could apply to the government for a grant of land, or ejido, for 
the members. The State retained the title to the land and the ejido received an indefinite 
usufructuary title. A part of the land was allocated to members, who had use rights only and did 
not have the right to sell, lease or mortgage the land while forests remained in collective 
management (FAO, 2000). In the 1940s, most forested areas in the region were part of the ejido 
system.  
1.4. Implementing Scientific Forest Management 
A presidential decree established the UIEFSR (Unidad Industrial de Explotacion Forestal  de San 
Rafael — San Rafael Industrial Unit of Forest Exploitation) — or Forestal — in 1947 and gave a 
renewable 60 year concession on the forests of the Izta-Popo area (Barreto Flores, 1998, p. 25). 
The mission of the Forestal was to supply the San Rafael Company while maintaining the forests 
in the Iztaccihuatl — Popocatepetl area (UIFSR, 1986). 
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Between 1947 and 1991, the Forestal was the pivotal organization in the management of the 
forests. It provided technical services such as “ calculating the annual logging, delimiting logging 
areas, marking trees to be logged, guarding forests, controlling and fighting fires, reforesting, 
improving eroded soils, and conducting research on the forest, controlling pests ” (UIEF, 1975, 
p. 11). In the 1980s, its staff was made of 1 director, 1 technical adviser, 3 technical assistants, 
5 field assistants, who were all forestry engineers, 43 permanent employees, 70 temporary 
workers, 23 temporary laborers (peones) for seed collection and around 30 wardens in the fire 
brigades (Barreto Flores, 1998, p. 44). The San Rafael Forestal was one of the most prestigious in 
the country and attracted engineers from all over Mexico (Barreto Flores, 1998). In addition, 
physical access to the forested mountains being a constant obstacle, the Direccion de Caminos 
(Roads Department) was established as a separate entity in 1966 to build roads into the forests.  
Managing scientifically the forests also implied using scientific forestry methods. An expert from 
a 1976 report highlights the rationale for the use of the method (Forestal, p. 13) :  
It is only through up-to-date knowledge of the natural resources that a rational 
management will be possible. For this reason, it is imperative to use the 
information that allow to detect changes that such resources face, under the 
positive action of its cultivation, protection and development, as well as under 
the negative actions such as plagues (pests), illnesses, irrational pasture, fires 
and illegal logging essentially that occur even when the forest technician 
develops special efforts to prevent them.    
The areas under the jurisdiction of the Forestal were (1) areas formerly part of the Izta-Popo 
National Park and (2) forested areas of the ejidos and bienes comunales2. The 1938 decree had 
established the Izta-Popo National Park, where logging, cultivation and hunting were forbidden to 
protect valuable landscapes around the volcanoes. A 1947 presidential decree aimed at extending 
the supply area for the San Rafael modified the borders of the Izta-Popo National Park from the 
3 000 m altitude line to the 3 600 m altitude line, which shrunk the park area from 89 800 ha to 
25 679 ha (Vargas, 1998). To these 64 121 ha were aggregated 57 000 formerly allocated by the 
land reform to the ejidos and bienes comunales. Altogether, the jurisdiction of the Forestal now 
extended over 120 000 ha (Forestal, 1986).  
The new regime did not disown forested areas from the ejidos. However, establishing a regime of 
forced collaboration, it considerably restricted the ejidos’ access to both decision-making and 
benefits of their management. First, the decree stated that the mission of all forests under the 
administration of the Forestal was to supply the Company. Thus, ejidos had to sell timber 
exclusively to the Company. The only exception to this monophony for farmers’ domestic use was 
under the condition that the Company would agree not to use a specified quantity of timber. In 
such as case was required an authorization from the Secretary of Agriculture (SA) to cut the wood 
for domestic uses only (Hinojosa Ortiz, 1958). Second, prices paid by the Company to the ejidos 
were set by the Secretary for Agriculture. The San Rafael paid timber as cellulose timber 
(celulosico), independently of its quality, which was a low quality / low price timber. Bargaining 
with the company representatives was extremely limited.  
 
2 Both Ejidos and Bienes comunales are farmers’ cooperatives and have collective, democratic decision making processes. However, the 
difference between the two forms is their origin. Bienes comunales dats back from before land concentration at the end of the 19th 
Century, whereas ejidos were established as a result of the land reform.  
A LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE 
 
 
7
 
 
 
Third, as owners of the forests, farmers had to pay for the technical services of the Forestal and 
for the works made by the Roads Department. These fees were automatically discounted from the 
amount received from the Company (Barrreto Flores, 1998, p. 24). For 100 pesos of timber paid 
for by the Company for cellulose timber, farmers received 10-12 % for stompage (derecho de 
monte) as compared to 30 % for the Direccion de Caminos (Roads Department), and 40 % for the 
Forestal for services (Barreto Flores, 1998 ; Chambille, 1983). Last but not least, ejidos were 
obliged to participate in the management scheme; they could not withdraw from it. Their role was 
limited to logging trees marked by the forestry engineers, and reforesting.  
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2. EVALUATING THE CORPORATE MANAGEMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES 
This management regime lasted with these general traits from 1948 to 1991. It was very 
controlling ; it imposed an organizational template, the use of scientific forestry methods, and 
strictly regulated farmers — company —Forestal relations. In this section, we evaluate this 
management regime.  
Official evaluations of the management regime are altogether of limited reliability. At the national 
level, the 1942 decree stated that the concession to the Forestal could be withdrawn would the law 
— including strictly defined management methods — not be applied. However, even if the 
performance of several Forestales in “ managing ” the forests was debatable (Hinojosa Ortiz, 
1958), no permits were withdrawn in more than 40  years (Simonian, 1995). This limited 
reliability of official documents in assessing the management regime also applies in the particular 
case of the San Rafael Forestal. Two official documents from 1987 and 1992 contradict each 
other. On one hand, the 1947-1986 report highlights the positive contribution of the Forestal’s 
rational management to the forest’s productive capacity (Forestal, 1987 ; Barreto Flores, 1998, 
p. 26). On the other hand, another official document, less than 5 years later, justified a ban on 
forest use based on the “ detrimental ” effects of the very same management practices :  
The technical and social economic studies conducted by the Secretary of Urban 
and Ecological Development in collaboration with the Secretary of Agriculture 
and Hydric Resources and of forest Protection of the State of Mexico have shown 
that the deforestation levels in the forests of the State of Mexico are damaging 
the ecosystems. For these reasons, it is imperative to submit immediately the 
forests to a ban while further studies are conducted to determine the conditions 
for its rational and orderly exploitation. (Barreto Flores, 1998, p.  55) 
Thus, to cut across this confusion regarding the official assessment of the Forestal’s performance, 
we propose to evaluate it from (1) environmental, (2) institutional and (3) social dynamic 
perspectives. The environmental perspective concerns specifically the biophysical management of 
the natural resources. The overall question we intend documenting is : ‘ Have the extractive 
practices implemented by the company been conducive to ecological sustainability ? ’ The 
institutional perspective focuses on the governance of the common pool of resources. In most 
resource bases, such as forests, fisheries, or agricultural lands, various user groups, such as 
farmers, loggers, fishers, and industrial users, compete in the extracting of various types of 
resources. From the institutional perspective, managing natural resources is an issue of governing 
the commons (Ostrom, 1990). The main questions we are interested in is : ‘ What institutions, 
defined as “rules in action”, (Ostrom, 1992) have been established to regulate competition among 
resource users in the common pool of resources ? — ‘ How and to whom have costs and benefits 
been assigned ? ’ 
The third perspective we are using concerns the effects of this management regime on the local 
social dynamics. Our postulate is that corporate practices and institutions affect local capacity 
building. Some institutional frameworks are empowering whereas others tend to disable local 
capacity building (Bird, 2000). Thus, the question we are documenting is : ‘ What have been the 
long term implications of these institutions on the local social dynamics among resource users ? ’ 
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2.1. Evaluation perspective 1 : ecological sustainability 
Documents consulted agree in their conclusions that extractive practices altogether were of low 
impact. The Forestal never practiced clear cutting (matarrazas) but implemented methods aimed 
at extracting from natural forests (Forestal, 1976 ; 46). These methods brought low yield per 
surface considered ; however, the large area under the management of the Forestal was sufficient 
to supply the Company. 
Managing the productive capacity of the forests also meant reforesting. Yet, there is controversy 
on the efforts made by the Forestal and the company to reforest. On one hand, the San Rafael 
Company always proudly emphasized its nature-oriented culture, including a “tree-loving” culture. 
Its first long time (1897-1936) general director, José de La Macorra, was a forestry engineer and 
had instilled a “pro-tree” culture in the Company. The Company actually started plantations as 
early as 1905, and a constant motto in corporate documents on the company’s forestry policy 
repeatedly affirmed that it was planting 10 trees for 1 cut (Club Deportivo Internacional, 1938). To 
foster a love of nature, the company also encouraged recreational and outing activities in the 
forests and in the mountains, both for its employees and for Mexico City dwellers. The social 
control the company exerted over the local community further limited traditional domestic logging 
practices :  
Nobody dared cut a lot, nobody here (in San Rafael) wanted trouble with the 
company. We all worked here or had a relative who worked here. (Local dweller, 
1999). 
To a certain extent, in San Rafael, the all encompassing paternalistic system refrained local 
dwellers from logging. This social control limited individual or household cutting while corporate 
efforts contributed to reforesting. Regarding the 1947-1986 period, the Forestal report states that 
“ between 1962 and 1985, 36 million trees were planted on 42 732 ha” (Forestal, 1987).  
On the other hand, a more detailed look at documents suggests that the company externalized most 
of the costs related to reforesting. First, there are no records of reforestation between 1947 and 
1962 while the Forestal logged around 1 million m3 in these 15 years. After 1962, the forced 
collaboration scheme inserted the ejidos as free labor for reforesting. Seeds and plants were 
provided for free by government’s greenhouses, transported to the areas by the company and 
planted by the ejidos. It was only in 1984 that the Forestal conceded ejido members to be 
remunerated for their labor (Barreto Flores, 1998, p. 26-27).  
2.2. Evaluation perspective 2 : Institution-building 
2.2.1. From the company’s perspective 
The forestal actually fulfilled its mission in terms of the Company. In the first half of the century 
the Company had to seek out timber supplies from other parts of the country. After 1948, the pace 
of cutting being decided in function of the Company’s cellulose needs, the Forestal overall 
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supplied the quantities required by the company (Forestry Engineer, pers. comm., January 2000). 
From 1947 to 1984, the forestal supplied 4 448 million m3 to the company (Barreto Flores, 1998).  
2.2.2. Forced collaboration with the ejidos 
The management regime assigned roles to the company, the Forestal and the ejidos in their 
contractual and working relations. Several mechanisms were used to devaluate benefits farmers 
obtained in the contracts. First, the Company paid all the timber as cellulose timber, which was to 
its advantage; the ejidos would have gained more selling the timber to Mexico City’s furniture 
markets. Second, contracts valued 4 times more services provided by the Forestal and 3 times 
more construction works realized by the Roads Department than stompage and labor provided by 
the farmers (Hinojosa Ortiz, 1958, p. 99; Forestal, 1976, 1987). Third, stompage was not paid 
directly to the farmers but was deposited on a bank account in a Trust for the Improvement of 
Rural Life (Fideicomiso para el mejoramiento de la vida rural), and farmers had a limited access 
to this fund. Alvarez Icasa et al. described the situation in a comparable ejido in the early 1990s as 
“ well funded bank accounts and poor farmers ” (Alvarez Icaza, 1993).  
This management regime also assigned sets of relationships between forest workers. Chambille 
(1983, p. 95-97) represented these relationships as a system of triple marginality, (1) inside the 
Forestal between the unionized contracted workers (de planta) and non unionized ad hoc workers 
(eventuales), (2) between workers from the Forestal and the ejido leaders; (3) inside the ejidos 
among ejido leaders and the other ejido members.  
There is a striking difference between the work conditions of the workers of the 
Forestal and the ejido members who work under the contractors. The relations 
between the unionized workers and the management of the Forestal are 
regulated by the annual contract whereas ejido members are recruited on an 
ad hoc basis and have no rights for healthcare. (…) Ejido members have lower 
salaries, more precarious labor conditions. The labor conditions of the ejido 
members are bad. In the mountain they sleep on the floor under a plastic veil 
(vela). By contrast, workers of the UF, when they go to the mountain, are housed 
in little wooden houses (with their whole families if they desire) with water, 
cafeteria, a small store and even two movies screenings a week (Chambille, 
1983, pp 83-84). 
2.2.3. Passive resistance 
How did ejidos react to this unfavorable scheme ? It took around three decades for some patterns 
of passive, scattered resistance to evolve slowly into a more open and united resistance. In the next 
paragraph, we inquire why.  
Interviews and forest reports confirm that the management scheme was actually never fully 
enforced. Poverty, that affected around 30 % of the population, according to engineers’ estimates, 
triggered “ ant logging ” — the extraction of timber for domestic uses. In designing their 
management plans, forestry engineers typically accounted around 10 % of the wood in “ illegal 
logging ”. Also, large areas of the forests planned to be managed were actually not managed. 
Forestal reports repeatedly (1952, 1966, 1976 and 1987) confirmed that about half of the area 
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attributed to the Forestal had not been managed because of conflicts inside the ejidos, and 
between ejidos and the Company. These conflicts impeded the signing of a company-ejido supply 
contract, thus disrupting the Forestal’s activities :  
The project — under management of the San Rafael — is comprised of 
129 parcels : 78 are in the management plan; among those 59 are more or less 
normally worked, 19 in moderately conflictive situations and are cultivated 
irregularly, 51 have not been included in the management plan for reasons 
independent of our doctrine or practice but due to local conflictive or illegal 
situations. (Forestal, 1976 — 62-63) 
2.2.4. Active resistance 
It took about three decades though for an active front of the ejidos to emerge and bargain one to 
one with the Company. The Forest ejidos federated only in 1974. In 1986 they established the 
Union de Ejidos Forestales to obtain better prices for stompage, timber and labor. In 1991, the 
ejidos finally obtained a 22 % raise, “ even if the prices paid by the company in the new agreement 
represented 50 % of the average market price of the same lumber in the State of Mexico ” (Barreto 
Flores, 1998). 
In sum, this very controlling management regime, instrumentalized by the Forestal, supplied the 
company with stable and low-priced raw material, and implemented scientific low-impact 
extractive practices. However, it favoured the Company at the expense of the ejidos, whose limited 
capacity for collective action hampered an improvement of their position in the forced 
collaboration. 
2.3. Evaluation Perspective 3 : Social dynamics and local capacity building 
The third perspective we are using focuses on the effects of this management regime on the local 
social dynamics and capacity building. The overall contribution of the company to the local 
economic development is undeniable. However, we would like to evaluate the effect of the 
company’s forest policies on the local social dynamics.  
Why did it take three decades for the ejidos’ to react ? The first set of reasons concerns the 
importance of the forest related incomes in the overall farmers’ income. Most ejidatarios were 
farmers and drew most if their livelihood from maize and animal husbandry. While their work in 
the fields provided their main income, the existing forest management regime further marginalized 
forest-related incomes. This low value for forest income thus limited individual motivation to act. 
Conflicts within the ejidos and frequent feuds further hampered capacity for action in 
renegotiating with the company. For instance, the ejido of Tlalmanalco, one of the main forest 
owners with 10 000 ha, has had a tradition of internal conflict. Out of the 13 presidents in the 1934 
— 1991 period, one was assassinated and 7 were removed by the ejido’s assembly before the end 
of their terms for “ poor management practices ” — an euphemism for corruption — (Ejidatario, 
Tlalmanalco, personal communication December 1999). Some local informants also suggested 
that the Company contributed to fuelling internal divisions within the ejidos, repeatedly bribing 
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the leader of the ejido in counterpart of lower prices for timber. The same practice is described in 
another Forestal by Chambille (1983, p. 76). 
2.4. Aftermath 
In June 1991, the San Rafael Company was declared bankrupt and closed. It reopened two months 
later with around 25 % of the initial personnel (Arango Miranda, 1997, p. 74). Among the 
departments closed was the cellulose plant. Cellulose being imported from Canada and the U.S.A., 
the end of the cellulose plant was the end of the raison d’être of this management regime. The 
Forestal closed in October 1991. The company has not been using local timber any more.  
There is a general sense in the region that forest management is currently in disarray (Casa UAM, 
1998). Smuggling has become widespread, inside and outside of the ejidos and recent studies 
concluded that the vegetal cover diminished by 30 % in the 1988-1993 period and that most trees 
are old and with a low reproductive capacity (Chavez, 1996).  
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3. (BRIEF) REFLECTIVE SECTION : A RETURN TO THEORY 
Research on corporate performance at large and corporate environmental performance in particular 
has traditionally focused on the use of (1) static or synchronical, (2) company-centered, (3) a 
contextual frameworks for analyzing corporate behavior (See Clarkson, 1995 ; Wood and Jones, 
1995 for reviews). More recently, however, the stakeholder perspective has been advocated to 
open the evaluation (Clarkson, 1995). In the case of the management of natural resources, research 
conducted in management has often tended to consider the situation once the natural resources are 
appropriated by a company, without considering (1) the interests and actions of other user groups 
and (2) the institutional framework that actually regulate users and uses of the resource base 
(Ostrom, 1990).  
This study of the environmental policies of the San Rafael Company (1947-1991) illustrates the 
need to broaden existing evaluative frameworks. Further research on the analysis of corporate 
environmental policies should aim at (1) including a historical dimension; (2) and considering the 
evolution of the relations between companies and local stakeholders; and (3) understanding the 
evolution of these relations in their institutional context. The challenge of developing this new, 
more encompassing, perspective makes historical perspectives more relevant than ever in 
understanding the evolution of relations between corporations, stakeholder groups and their 
common resource base, and more broadly between human societies and ecosystems. 
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